Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy by Dodge, William S.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2007
Customary International Law and the Question of
Legitimacy
William S. Dodge
UC Hastings College of the Law, dodgew@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 Harvard Law Review Forum 19 (2007).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1023
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY
William S. Dodge*
Responding to Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H.
Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Rele-
vance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007).
In 1997, Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith shook the
international law academy by arguing that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' made it illegitimate for federal
courts to continue to apply customary international law (which they
called CIL) without further authorization from Congress. 2 The Su-
preme Court's 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain3 seemed to
reject this argument, holding that federal courts could apply customary
international law under the Alien Tort Statute4 (ATS) without any au-
thorization beyond the jurisdictional grant.5 Undaunted, Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith (joined now by Professor David Moore) have
returned to claim that Sosa in fact supports their argument and that
"courts can domesticate CIL only in accordance with the requirements
and limitations of post-Erie federal common law."6 In my view, their
latest article not only misinterprets Sosa but also raises fundamental
questions concerning both the legitimacy of customary international
law itself and the legitimacy of requiring its express incorporation into
the U.S. legal system, a requirement that is contrary to the understand-
ing of the founding generation.
I. MISREADING SOSA
Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore start by contrasting two
positions.7 The first, which they call the "modern position," holds that
federal courts may apply customary international law "without any
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. My thanks to Ash
Bhagwat, Martin Flaherty, and Reuel Schiller for comments on an earlier draft.
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, no HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997).
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
5 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
6 Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV L. REV 869, 874 (2007).
7 See id. at 870-71.
19
HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [
need for it to be enacted or implemented by Congress." The second,
which is their own position, holds that federal courts may not apply
customary international law unless expressly authorized by the Consti-
tution or a statute. Specifically, they assert that a court must find
"positive authority for the incorporation" of customary international
law into the U.S. legal system.9 The authors claim that Sosa rejected
the first position and endorsed the second, and that it found authority
for the incorporation of customary international law in the ATS itself:
"[T]he Court inferred, from a jurisdictional statute that enabled courts
to apply CIL as general common law, the authorization for courts to
create causes of action for CIL violations, in narrow circumstances, as
a matter of post-Erie federal common law."' 0
In fact, the Sosa Court expressly rejected this interpretation of the
ATS. The respondent Alvarez argued "that the ATS was intended not
simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation of a
new cause of action for torts in violation of international law."" The
Court dismissed this reading as "implausible,"1 2 agreeing instead with
the petitioner Sosa that the ATS was "only jurisdictional."' 3 Neverthe-
less, the Court rejected Sosa's claim that because the ATS was only ju-
risdictional further congressional action was needed to authorize suits.
Instead, the Court adopted the view of the amici professors of federal
jurisdiction and legal history that the common law provided a right to
sue.14 As the Court summarized, "[t]he jurisdictional grant is best read
as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of interna-
tional law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time."" Rather than rejecting the view that federal courts may apply
customary international law without express incorporation by Con-
gress, the Supreme Court endorsed it - not as a "modern position" but
as the original understanding.
Ironically, Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore's reading of
Sosa is inconsistent not only with its holding but also with the post-
Erie rules of federal common law to which the authors purport to ad-
here. The Court has made it quite clear that "[t]he vesting of jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority
8 Id. at 871 (quoting Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH.
L. REV 1555, 1561 (1984)).
9 Id. at 903.
10 Id. at 895.
1 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
12 Id. at 713.
13 Id. at 112.
14 Id. at 714. I should disclose that I wrote the amicus brief in question, which is reprinted at
28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV 95 (2004).
15 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
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to formulate federal common law."1 6 Acknowledging this, Professors
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore observe that there is "tension, if not
outright contradiction, in the Court's construction of the ATS as both
purely jurisdictional and an authorization for creating causes of ac-
tion."" But this tension is of their own making and vanishes once one
accepts, as the Sosa Court did, that congressional authorization is un-
necessary because customary international law is already part of the
U.S. legal system.
This is not to say that the Sosa Court ignored the changes in do-
mestic and international law that have occurred over the past two cen-
turies or that Erie is irrelevant to translating provisions like the Alien
Tort Statute into modern terms. Indeed, the Court discussed Erie
when explaining why it is best to be cautious in interpreting the ATS's
jurisdictional grant. But in the Court's view, Erie and other changes
in domestic and international law are prudential considerations -
"reasons . . . for caution""' - not requirements that may override the
original understanding.
II. ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
The original understanding was that federal courts could apply the
law of nations to resolve questions that depended on it in any case
over which those courts had jurisdiction. No act of Congress incorpo-
rating the law of nations into domestic law was necessary because the
law of nations was already part of the common law. "[T]he law of na-
tions," Blackstone wrote, "is here adopted in [its] full extent by the
common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land."' 9 The
colonists brought this principle with them to America and used it in a
variety of contexts.2 0 As Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore
concede, "during the period prior to Erie, federal courts often applied
CIL ... without requiring authorization from the federal political
branches." 21
The boundaries of the law of nations in the late eighteenth century
were different from those of customary international law today. The
law of nations included not just rules that applied between states, but
16 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981).
17 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 6, at 896.
18 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
19 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.
20 For more detailed discussion, see William S. Dodge, The Story of The Paquete Habana:
Customary International Law as Part of Our Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAw STORIES (Laura
Dickinson et al. eds., forthcoming 2007).
21 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 6, at 882.
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also maritime law, the law merchant, and the conflict of laws. 22 These
boundaries shifted over the next two centuries. "Domestic law ab-
sorbed the private-law elements of the law of nations," 2 3 while new
rules of customary international law emerged in areas like human
rights. Such changes would not have surprised the Framers, who un-
derstood that customary international law evolves and that the law of
nations in their own time differed from that of Greece and Rome.24
As Justice Story wrote, "[i]t does not follow . . . that because a princi-
ple cannot be found settled by the consent or practice of nations at one
time, it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent period the principle
can be considered as incorporated into the public code of nations." 2
As the scope of customary international law changed, so did the
jurisprudential foundations of both the law of nations and the common
law. In the late eighteenth century, all law was thought to rest ulti-
mately on natural law. "[N]o human laws are of any validity, if con-
trary to this," Blackstone wrote, "and such of them as are valid derive
all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from
this original." 26 At least since Grotius, the law of nations had been
understood to have a positive aspect as well, "having its origin in cus-
tom and tacit agreement."27 But Vattel, the writer upon whom early
Americans relied most heavily for the law of nations, emphasized its
natural law basis, titling his book The Law of Nations, or the Princi-
ples of Natural Law, Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Na-
tions and of Sovereigns.28  Over the course of the nineteenth century,
the foundations of both the law of nations and the common law
changed from natural law to positivism, but they did so in distinct
ways.
22 See generally 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note ig, at *66-73; E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS (photo. reprint 1995) (Charles G. Fenwick trans. 1916) (1758).
23 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 822.
24 See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J., concurring) ("When the
United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modern state of purity and refinement."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney
(May 7, 1793), in 7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 312, 314 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1904) (referring to "the principles of that law [of nations] as they have been liberalized in latter
times by the refinement of manners & morals, and evidenced by the Declarations, Stipulations,
and Practice of every civilized Nation"); Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), in 32 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES,
1745-1799, at 430 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (referring to "the modern usage of nations").
25 United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
26 I BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *41.
27 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 9 (photo. reprint 1995) (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1646).
28 VATTEL, supra note 22.
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For the common law, the loss of faith in natural law required an-
other source of authority upon which to ground its rules.29 "The com-
mon law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky," Justice Holmes
famously wrote, "but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified."3 0  If judges "made" rather than
"found" the common law, it followed that they needed lawmaking au-
thority. It was this change that led ultimately to Erie.
The transition from natural law to positivism in customary interna-
tional law was different. When its natural law foundation crumbled,
customary international law came to rest on the positive authority of
custom. No longer was the law of nations "deduced by correct reason-
ing from the rights and duties of nations, and the nature of moral obli-
gation."3 1 Rather, courts looked to what the Court in The Paquete
Habana32 called "the customs and usages of civilized nations," us-
ages that manifested "the general assent of civilized nations." 34 "[T]he
law[] of nations," declared the Supreme Court in The Scotia,35 "rests
upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of force, not
because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it has
been generally accepted as a rule of conduct."3 6 Because positive cus-
tomary international law was grounded in state practice and consent,
it was not open to the same charge of judicial lawmaking as the com-
mon law more generally. Judges applying customary international law
still "found" the law, but they found it now in state practice rather
than in principles of natural law.3 7
Erie ratified the positivist view of the common law. It declared
that "law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist
without some definite authority behind it." 3 For the common law,
that authority could only be the authority of a state because the federal
government had no authority to make substantive rules of common
law. But by 1938, customary international law already rested on a
positivist foundation of state practice and consent. Customary interna-
29 See Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset
of Positivism, So VAND. L. REV 1387, 1391 (1991).
30 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 , 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31 United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
32 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
33 Id. at 700.
34 Id. at 694.
35 81 U.S. 170 (1872).
36 Id. at 187.
37 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, Io HARV. L. REV. 853, 876 (1987) ("[C]ourts do not create but rather
find international law, generally by examining the practices and attitudes of foreign states.").
38 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing)).
23
HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM
tional law did have "some definite authority behind it" - the consent
of nations reflected in their practice.39
Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore would read Erie to re-
quire not just a positivist foundation for customary international law
but also "positive authority for the incorporation" of customary inter-
national law into the U.S. legal system. 40 Because this is contrary to
the original understanding that federal courts could apply customary
international law without such incorporation, one might ask upon
what authority this additional requirement is based. Why should this
reading of Erie trump the original understanding?
Under Erie's own positivist view, which the authors adopt, author-
ity for the additional requirement of incorporation would have to be
found in a statute or the Constitution. If it were simply the product of
judicial lawmaking, it would be illegitimate. Erie itself disclaimed any
reliance on legislative changes and rested its decision expressly on con-
stitutional grounds. 41 "Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State,"42 the Court wrote, and in
exercising such power the federal courts had "invaded rights which in
our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States."43
But no such constitutional infirmity exists with respect to customary
international law. Congress has express authority under Article I of
the Constitution to "define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of
Nations."44 Moreover, the Constitution vests the federal government
with the vast majority of powers over foreign relations. As Dean Har-
old Koh has noted, "[f]ederal judicial determination of most questions
of customary international law transpires not in a zone of core state
concerns, such as state tort law, but in a foreign affairs area in which
the Tenth Amendment has reserved little or no power to the states." 45
In short, the authority that supports Erie's application to state tort law
does not support its application to customary international law. Lack-
ing a statutory or constitutional basis for their incorporation require-
ment, Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore's argument fails
Erie's own test of legitimacy.
39 Erie itself involved no question of customary international law. Nor did Erie affect the
status of customary international law indirectly by overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) i
(1842). It is true that Swift applied the law merchant, which was then considered part of the law
of nations, but by 1938 customary international law no longer covered such topics, and the Erie
Court would not have viewed Swift as involving anything other than issues of domestic law. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
40 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 6, at 903.
41 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
42 Id. at 78.
43 Id. at 8o.
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. i0.
45 Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, iII HARV L. REV 1824,
1831-32 (1998).
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Like the authors, Justice Scalia would reject the original under-
standing that federal courts may apply customary international law
without legislative incorporation because "that understanding rested
upon a notion of general common law that has been repudiated by
Erie." 46 Justice Scalia offered no authority for rejecting the original
understanding, but assured us that "[d]espite the avulsive change of
Erie, the Framers ... would be entirely content with the post-Erie sys-
tem I have described, and quite terrified by the 'discretion' endorsed
by the Court."47 Customary international law today limits what a na-
tion can do to its own citizens. "The Framers would, I am confident,
be appalled by the proposition that, for example, the American peo-
ples' democratic adoption of the death penalty . .. could be judicially
nullified because of the disapproving views of foreigners." 48  I see no
evidence for these assertions but plenty of evidence that the Framers
expected customary international law to evolve. 49 Perhaps surpris-
ingly, it was not Justice Scalia but the Sosa majority that seemed most
committed to the original understanding and to the need for some le-
gitimate source of authority for departing from it. "We think it would
be unreasonable," the Court said, "to assume that the First Congress
would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize en-
forceable international norms simply because the common law might
lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism."s0
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Despite the lack of authority for a positive incorporation require-
ment, one might argue that it is nevertheless necessary to remedy a
lack of legitimacy in customary international law itself. In their 1997
article, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith criticized the position that
federal courts could apply customary international law without legisla-
tive incorporation as being "in tension with basic notions of American
representative democracy."" In Sosa, Justice Scalia made the same
argument more colorfully:
46 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 744 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 749.
48 Id. at 750.
49 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. In other contexts, Justice Scalia has been
willing to read statutory references to the common law as allowing for evolution. See Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (noting that the Sherman Act "invokes the
common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the
term ['restraint of trade'] in 1890").
5o Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730.
51 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 857; see also John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should
International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV (forthcoming 2007); Phillip R. Trimble,
A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 718-23 (1986).
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We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us. We
elect representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact
the new law and present it for the approval of a President, whom we also
elect. For over two decades now, unelected federal judges have been
usurping this lawmaking power by converting what they regard as norms
of international law into American law.52
Essentially, this legitimacy critique consists of two interrelated points:
that the power to apply customary international law gives too much
discretion to federal judges - discretion to smuggle into American law
whatever "they regard as norms of international law" - and that cus-
tomary international law is not made through a democratically ac-
countable political system.
The response to the first point is that federal judges may not read
into customary international law anything they would like to see. Un-
der the positivist theory that has prevailed since the nineteenth cen-
tury, customary international law must be based upon "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal ob-
ligation."53 As the Second Circuit noted in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,54
"[t]he requirement that a rule command the 'general assent of civilized
nations' to become binding upon them all is a stringent one."55 Ex-
perience has shown that the federal courts have had no difficulty ap-
plying this test and distinguishing real rules of customary international
law like the prohibition against torture5 6 from spurious ones like the
prohibition against domestic pollution.57 In fact, modern customary
international law gives judges far less discretion than the law of na-
tions the Framers expected federal courts to apply. Under a natural
law theory, as Justice Story wrote, "every doctrine, that may fairly be
deduced by correct reasoning from the rights and duties of nations,
and the nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in
the law of nations."58 The same is decidedly not true today.
The response to the second point is that although customary inter-
national law is not made through a democratically accountable politi-
cal system, it may be limited or overridden democratically. Congress
controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts and could restrict their
jurisdiction over questions of customary international law. Alterna-
tively, Congress could override substantive rules of customary interna-
52 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
54 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
55 Id. at 881 ('980) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
56 See, e.g., id. at 88o.
57 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F 3 d 233, 255 (2d Cir. 2003).58 United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
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tional law by enacting a statute to the contrary.X Indeed, Sosa ac-
knowledged that Congress has the power "to shut the door to the law
of nations entirely . .. at any time . .. ,just as it may modify or cancel
any judicial decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international
norm as such." 60 Just as the possibility of legislative override provides
democratic legitimacy to judge-made common law,6 1 so too it provides
legitimacy to customary international law made by the general assent
of nations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sosa is centrally concerned with questions of legitimacy and how to
remain faithful to the meaning of provisions written in a very different
legal environment. These questions are relevant not just to the ATS
but also to other statutes and to various constitutional provisions.
Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore offer their views on some
of these provisions in their article, 62 while I have offered my own else-
where.63 What fundamentally separates my positions from theirs is
that I would begin with the original understanding of each provision
and ask whether there is a legitimate reason to depart from it, while
they begin and end with the positivist framework of Erie.
It might appear at first glance that the democratic legitimacy of
customary international law is questionable and that requiring Con-
gress to incorporate it expressly would bolster its legitimacy. I have
argued that the opposite is true. The requirements of customary inter-
national law already operate to constrain the discretion of federal
judges, while the possibility of legislative override confers legitimacy.
Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore's incorporation require-
ment, by contrast, rests on nothing but "academic fiat."64
59 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § ii5(i)(a) (1987) ("An act of
Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international agree-
ment as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision
is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.").
60 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004).
61 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92 (1982)
(noting that "judge-made rules are all in a sense conditional, that is, they are subject to legislative
or popular revision and hence are acceptable in a democracy").
62 See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 6, at 911-35.
63 See William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of Customary International Law in the
United States, in OUTSOURCING AMERICAN LAW (Jack Goldsmith & John Yoo eds., forthcom-
ing 2007); William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal Sys-
tem After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87 (2004); William S. Dodge,
The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 687 (2002).
64 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 821.
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